ink
it wise or right for ourselves to do in a similar case; secondly, from
the constitution and course of nature, from which we may learn by
experience what God's providence in certain cases actually is; and
thirdly, from revelation, attested by its proper evidences. Where these
three agree in their testimony (as in the great majority of cases they
do) we have the moral certainty which results from the harmony of all
accessible evidences: where they appear to differ, we have no right at
once to conclude that the second or the third must give way to the first,
and not _vice versa_; because we have no right to assume that the first
alone is infallible. In the author's own words: "The lesson to be learnt
from an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought is not that man's
judgments are _worthless_ in relation to Divine things, but that they are
_fallible_: and the probability of error in any particular case can never
be fairly estimated without giving their full weight to all collateral
considerations. We are indeed bound to believe that a Revelation given by
God can never contain anything that is really unwise or unrighteous; but
we are not always capable of estimating exactly the wisdom or
righteousness of particular doctrines or precepts. And we are bound to
bear in mind that _exactly in proportion to the strength of the remaining
evidence for the Divine origin of a religion, is the probability that we
may be mistaken in supposing this or that portion of its contents to be
unworthy of God._ Taken in conjunction, the two arguments may confirm or
correct each other: taken singly and absolutely, each may vitiate the
result which should follow from their joint application."[BD]

[BD] _Bampton Lectures_, p. 156, 4th edition.

In criticising the first part of this argument--that which is directed
against the deductive philosophy of the Unconditioned--Mr. Mill manifests
the same want of acquaintance with its meanings, and with the previous
history of the question; which he had before exhibited in his attack on
Sir W. Hamilton. He begins by finding fault with the definition of the
Absolute, which Mr. Mansel (herein departing, and purposely departing,
from Sir W. Hamilton's use of the term) defines as "that which exists in
and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." On this,
Mr. Mill remarks: "The first words of his definition would serve for the
description of a Noumenon; but Mr. Mansel's Absolute is