, that we must believe in
the existence of an absolute and infinite Being, though unable to
conceive the nature of such a Being. To believe in such a Being, is
simply to believe that God made the world: to declare the nature of such
a Being inconceivable, is simply to say that we do not know how the world
was made. If we believe that God made the world, we must believe that
there was a time when the world was not, and when God alone existed, out
of relation to any other being. But the mode of that sole existence we
are unable to conceive, nor in what manner the first act took place by
which the absolute and self-existent gave existence to the relative and
dependent. "The contradictions," says Mr. Mill, "which Mr. Mansel asserts
to be involved in the notions, do not follow from an imperfect mode of
apprehending the Infinite and the Absolute, but lie in the definitions of
them, in the meaning of the words themselves." They do no such thing: the
meaning of the words is perfectly intelligible, and is exactly what is
expressed by their definitions: the contradictions arise from the attempt
to combine the attributes expressed by the words in one representation
with others, so as to form a positive object of consciousness. Where is
the incongruity of saying, "I believe that a being exists possessing
certain attributes, though I am unable in my present state of knowledge
to conceive the manner of that existence?" Mr. Mill, at all events, is
the last man in the world who has any right to complain of such a
distinction--Mr. Mill, who considers it not incredible that in some part
of the universe two straight lines may enclose a space, or two and two
make five; though he is compelled to allow that under our present laws of
thought, or, if he pleases, of association, we are unable to conceive how
these things can be.

It is wearisome work to wade through this mass of misconceptions; yet we
must entreat the reader's patience a little longer, while we say a few
words in conclusion on perhaps the greatest misconception of all--though
that is bold language to use with regard to Mr. Mill's metaphysics,--at
any rate, the one which he expresses in the most vehement language. Mr.
Mansel, as we have said, asserts, as many others have asserted before
him, that the relation between the communicable attributes of God and the
corresponding attributes of man is one not of identity, but of analogy;
that is to say, that the Divine attributes have th