e same relation to the
Divine nature that the human attributes have to human nature. Thus, for
example, there is a Divine justice and there is a human justice; but God
is just as the Creator and Governor of the world, having unlimited
authority over all His creatures and unlimited jurisdiction over all
their acts; and man is just in certain special relations, as having
authority over some persons and some acts only, so far as is required for
the needs of human society. So, again, there is a Divine mercy and there
is a human mercy; but God is merciful in such a manner as is fitting
compatibly with the righteous government of the universe; and man is
merciful in a certain limited range, the exercise of the attribute being
guided by considerations affecting the welfare of society or of
individuals. Or to take a more general case: Man has in himself a rule of
right and wrong, implying subjection to the authority of a superior (for
conscience has authority only as reflecting the law of God); while God
has in Himself a rule of right and wrong, implying no higher authority,
and determined absolutely by His own nature. The case is the same when we
look at moral attributes, not externally, in their active manifestations,
but internally, in their psychological constitution. If we do not
attribute to God the same complex mental constitution of reason, passion,
and will, the same relation to motives and inducements, the same
deliberation and choice of alternatives, the same temporal succession of
facts in consciousness, which we ascribe to man,--it will follow that
those psychological relations between reason, will, and desire, which are
implied in the conception of human action, cannot represent the Divine
excellences in themselves, but can only illustrate them by analogies from
finite things. And if man is liable to error in judging of the conduct of
his fellow-men, in proportion as he is unable to place himself in their
position, or to realise to himself their modes of thought and principles
of action--if the child, for instance, is liable to error in judging the
actions of the man,--or the savage of the civilised man,--surely there is
far more room for error in men's judgment of the ways of God, in
proportion as the difference between God and man is greater than the
difference between a man and a child.

This doctrine elicits from Mr. Mill the following extraordinary outburst
of rhetoric:--

"If, instead of the glad tidings