that there exists a Being in whom
all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive,
exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world
is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they
are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government,
except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of
conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will
bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this,
and at the same time call this being by the names which express and
affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will
not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one
thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him.
I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that
epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me
to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."--(P. 103.)

We will not pause to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation;
we will simply ask whether Mr. Mill really supposes the word _good_ to
lose all community of meaning, when it is applied, as it constantly is,
to different persons among our "fellow-creatures," with express reference
to their different duties and different qualifications for performing
them? The duties of a father are not the same as those of a son; is the
word therefore wholly equivocal when we speak of one person as a _good
father_, and another as a _good son_? Nay, when we speak generally of a
man as _good_, has not the epithet a tacit reference to human nature and
human duties? and yet is there no community of meaning when the same
epithet is applied to other Creatures? [Greek: He arete pros to ergon
to oikeion]--the goodness of any being whatever has relation to the
nature and office of that being. We may therefore test Mr. Mill's
declamation by a parallel case. A wise and experienced father addresses a
young and inexperienced son: "My son," he says, "there may be some of my
actions which do not seem to you to be wise or good, or such as you would
do in my place. Remember, however, that your duties are different from
mine; that your knowledge of my duties is very imperfect; and that there
may be things which you cannot now see to be wise and good, but which you
may hereafter discover to be so." "Father," says the son, "your
principles of action are not the same as mine;