the highest morality which
I can conceive at present does not sanction them; and as for believing
that you are good in anything of which I do not plainly see the
goodness,"--We will not repeat Mr. Mill's alternative; we will only ask
whether it is not just possible that there may be as much difference
between man and God as there is between a child and his father?

This declamation is followed by a sneer, which is worth quoting, not on
its own account, but as an evidence of the generosity with which Mr. Mill
deals with the supposed motives of his antagonists, and of the accuracy
of his acquaintance with the subject discussed. He says:--

"It is worthy of remark, that the doubt whether words applied to
God have their human signification, is only felt when the words
relate to his moral attributes; it is never heard of with regard to
his power. We are never told that God's omnipotence must not be
supposed to mean an infinite degree of the power we know in man and
nature, and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill
us, or consign us to eternal flames. The Divine Power is always
interpreted in a completely human signification; but the Divine
Goodness and Justice must be understood to be such only in an
unintelligible sense. Is it unfair to surmise that this is because
those who speak in the name of God, have need of the human
conception of his power, since an idea which can overawe and
enforce obedience must address itself to real feelings; but are
content that his goodness should be conceived only as something
inconceivable, because they are so often required to teach
doctrines respecting him which conflict irreconcilably with all
goodness that we can conceive?"--(P. 104.)

On the latter part of this paragraph we will not attempt to comment. But
as regards the former part, we meet Mr. Mill's confident assertion with a
direct denial, and take the opportunity of informing him that the
conception of infinite Power has suggested the same difficulties; and has
been discussed by philosophers and theologians in the same manner, as
those of infinite Wisdom and infinite Goodness. Has Mr. Mill never heard
of such questions as, Whether Omnipotence can reverse the past?--Whether
God can do that which He does not will to do?--Whether God's perfect
foreknowledge is compatible with his own perfect liberty?--Whether God
could have made a better world than the existing one? Nay, has not our