torpedo have greatly increased, but there is little evidence
connecting these features with the performance of torpedoes in the
present war. So far as known, the submarines have done most of their
effective work at short ranges where hits were to be expected. And
no one will ever know how many shots have missed. The great
outstanding lesson thus far is the extraordinary destructiveness of
the torpedoes that have found their mark. It would never have been
believed two years ago that ships like the _Cressy_, _Aboukir_, and
_Hogue_ would turn turtle a few minutes after a single blow from a
torpedo. Still less would it have seemed possible to sink a
_Lusitania_ in fifteen minutes. A torpedo might, of course, produce
an extraordinary effect if it chanced to strike a boiler compartment
or a magazine. But it does not appear that this happened in any one
of the many disasters in question. It has been said that the German
torpedoes carry an exceptionally heavy explosive charge, the extra
weight having been gained by a sacrifice in speed and range. This
may in part explain their effectiveness, but when all allowance is
made for what we know or guess along this and similar lines, the
fact remains that the torpedo has shown itself a weapon of vastly
greater destructive power than the world has heretofore attributed
to it.

The story of the Dardanelles campaign has illustrated again the
futility of attacking land fortifications by battleships. Attacks of
this kind have never succeeded, and the temptation is strong to
accept the theory that in planning these operations the British
anticipated little or no resistance from those in command of the
forts. It was conceivable that the forts could be passed--as were
those at New Orleans and Mobile Bay by Farragut--but not that they
could be reduced by the gun fire of ships. Information is lacking as
to the damage actually done. It was probably greater than the
defenders have admitted; but it evidently fell far short of
silencing the forts. If the world needed a new demonstration of the
power of forts to stand out against ships, we may put this down as
one more lesson of the war.

An important revelation of the war is the smoothness and rapidity with
which large bodies of troops, with all their impedimenta--horses,
artillery, etc.--have been transported by water. This has, of course,
been possible only for Great Britain and her allies, and for them only
because they have held unchallenged