and the little Belgian army of eighty
thousand ill trained and equipped men in the first month of the war.
By using their interior lines, striking first in the west and then
in the east, the Germans were warranted on paper in counting on
successes that might have ended the war within the first four or
five months.

The frontier of France from Switzerland to Luxemburg, when manned by
the large numbers of the French army, became a battle front. There
was no room for a flanking operation. German ambition for a decisive
and prompt victory over the French army must have room for a turning
movement. The Germans made the invasion of Belgium a military
necessity for their purpose, which was the destruction of the French
army. They had built the great 17-inch mortars for smashing the
Belgian fortresses in order to open the gate for the flood which was
to sweep southward to Paris. These guns were less practicable for
field work or even for trench work, being best against cities and
stationary guns in forts.

Thus the German plan of campaign was fully developed the second day
of the war. It was no longer a secret to the general public, let
alone to the French staff, which recognized that it had to deal with
this effort of the German wing to come through Belgium. A French
movement into Alsace failed. The public reason given for this was
that it was a political demonstration in raising the Tricolor over
the "lost provinces" dear to the heart of every Frenchman.
Another--a military reason--which would seem a more obvious one to
the soldier, was a counteroffensive to draw off the force of the
German offensive at Liege and Namur, hoping thus, at least, while
Liege and Namur were holding the German right in position, to force
the German left to the bank of the Rhine. If you will look at the
map you will see that this strategy becomes transparently
intelligible.

Thus early in August the French were trying to turn the German left,
and the Germans were preparing to turn the French left. Had the
Belgians had anything like an adequate army, had it been skillfully
handled; had the fortress of Namur held ten days as many thought it
would, the German right might have been held long enough to prevent
the Germans forcing a battle on the Marne. By the third week of
August, however, the Germans had won their first point. They had
broken through Namur, so incapably defended. They had broken the
French left, put the British to flight, compelli