e defeat at Lublin in thinking
that they might have overestimated the Austrian army and
underestimated the Russian. In this case they might face the danger
of an invasion of Germany itself from Russia. Owing to the
heterogeneous character of the Austrian army with its many races and
the many pessimistic prophesies that have been made about the
loyalty of the Slav portions of Austria, which were fulfilled it is
said by the mutiny of some Slav regiments, it looked as if such
apprehensions had been well grounded.

In winning Lublin the Russians had done a distinct service to the
French in relieving pressure at the Marne and by their invasion of
East Prussia they undertook a service of a similar kind. The advance
of the Russian "steam roller" into Prussia so much heralded at the
time amounted to little more than an immense raid, as numbers go in
the greatest struggle of all history.

It won laurels for Von Hindenburg, a retired general, who became the
hero of the war in Germany, again illustrating that in this, as in
other wars, the fortune of circumstances and the character of your
enemy have much to do with the creation of martial glory. For it is
an open question if as a military feat Von Kluck's skillful
extrication of his army from the position beyond Paris is not as
worthy of praise as Von Hindenburg's clever victory of Tannenberg.

Though the German armies had not been able to gain a decisive
victory over the French, they had established themselves on French
soil. All the destructive effects of war must be borne by their
adversary while they could make use of the regions occupied to
supply and feed their troops. They had put the burden of direct
economic waste on the French and deprived them of economic supplies,
while the psychologic value of driving home to the enemy population
the ravages of war is considered important by military leaders.

Nor could the economic advantage be adequately measured by extent of
area occupied; for the one-twenty-sixth of the territory of France
which was held by the Germans represented far more than
one-twenty-sixth of French producing power for war purposes. A
nation's true material wealth in peace may be in its farms and
vineyards, but in war it is in the coal and steel and machine shops.
The "Black Country" of northern France of no interest to the
tourist, plays the same part to industrial France that the
Pittsburgh region plays to industrial America. Besides, with Lille
in G