d defensive operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain
risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the
defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance,
holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the
exposure to which the assailant submits himself. These radical
differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly
recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them,
that the former was ordinarily chosen by the English, because their
steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy; whereas the
French sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able
to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive
encounters and preserve their ships. The French, with rare exceptions,
subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations,
grudged the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize
their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts
to the repelling of assaults. For this course the lee-gage, skilfully
used, was admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more courage
than conduct; but when Rodney showed an intention to use the advantage
of the wind, not merely to attack, but to make a formidable
concentration on a part of the enemy's line, his wary opponent, De
Guichen, changed his tactics. In the first of their three actions the
Frenchman took the lee-gage; but after recognizing Rodney's purpose he
manoeuvred for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse
action except on his own terms. The power to assume the offensive, or
to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party
which has the greater speed; which in a fleet will depend not only
upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical
uniformity of action. Henceforth the ships which have the greatest
speed will have the weather-gage.
It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for
useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of
galleys. Both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship;
both have also points of essential difference, which make it
impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical
_precedents_ to be followed. But a precedent is different from and
less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty,
or may cease to apply through change of circumstances;
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