een tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be
decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre
of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war;
its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be
concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the
maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base;
the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary
operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be
most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by
holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping
must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these
history has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable
discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of
the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St.
Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with
France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere
historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles
upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's
policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his
brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.
It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the
teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened.
They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also
as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions.
This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into
collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought
them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the
weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of
fighting,--in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the
battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected
with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from
the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This
view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad
strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat,
which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will
continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and
narrow even as to tactics. The battle
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