The sum-total of the separate leaves,
blossoms, stalks, roots, of the plant does not, by a great deal,
constitute the plant. The parts must be joined together in a special
manner. So, likewise, it is not enough to add together the
characteristics common to the separate sense-representations in order to
obtain from these the regulating and controlling "I." Rather there
results from the increasing number and manifoldness of the
sense-impressions a continually increasing growth of the gray substance
of the child's cerebrum, a rapid increase of the intercentral connecting
fibers, and through this a readier co-excitement--association, so
called--which unites feeling with willing and thinking in the child.

This union is the "I," the sentient and emotive, the desiring and
willing, the perceiving and thinking "I."

CHAPTER XX.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

Of all the facts that have been established by me through the
observation of the child in the first years of his life, the _formation
of concepts without language_ is most opposed to the traditional
doctrines, and it is just this on which I lay the greatest stress.

It has been demonstrated that the human being, at the very beginning of
his life, not only distinguishes pleasure and discomfort, but may also
have single, distinct sensations. He behaves on the first day
differently, when the appropriate sense-impressions exist, from what he
does when they are lacking. The first effect of these feelings, these
few sensations, is the association of their traces, left behind in the
central nervous system, with inborn movements. Those traces or central
impressions develop gradually the personal _memory_. These movements are
the point of departure for the primitive activity of the intellect,
which separates the sensations both in time and in space. When the
number of the memory-images, of distinct sensations, on the one hand, on
the other, of the movements that have been associated with them--e. g.,
"sweet" and "sucking"--has become larger, then a firmer association of
sensation-and-movement-memories, i. e., of excitations of sensory and
motor ganglionic cells takes place, so that excitement of the one brings
with it co-excitement of the other. Sucking awakens the recollection of
the sweet taste; the sweet taste of itself causes sucking. This
succession is already a separation _in time_ of two sensations (the
sweet and the motor sensation in sucking). The separation in space
r