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mata ton kategorion]. It is evident from this that the categories can be regarded neither as purely logical nor as purely metaphysical elements. They indicate the general forms or ways in which Being can be predicated; they are determinations of Being regarded as an object of thought, and consequently as matter of speech. It becomes apparent also why the analysis of the categories starts from the singular thing, for it is the primary form under which all that is becomes object of knowledge, and the other categories modify or qualify this real individual. [Greek: Panta de ta gignomena hupo te tinos gignetai kai ek tinos kai ti. To de ti lego kath hekasten kategorian e gar tode e poson e poion e pon]. (_Met._ p. 1032 a 13-15) ... The categories, therefore, are not logical forms, but real predicates; they are the general modes in which Being may be expressed. The definite thing, that which comes forward in the process from potentiality to full actuality, can only appear and be spoken of under forms of individuality, quality, quantity and so on. The nine later categories all denote entity in a certain imperfect fashion. The categories then are not to be regarded as heads of predicates, the framework into which predicates can be thrown. They are real determinations of Being--_allgemeine Bestimmtheiten_, as Hegel calls them. They are not _summa genera_ of existences, still less are they to be explained as a classification of namable things in general. The objections Mill has taken to the list are entirely irrelevant, and would only have significance if the categories were really--what they are not--an exhaustive division of concrete existences. Grote's view (_Aristotle_, i. 108) that Aristotle drew up his list by examining Various popular propositions, and throwing the different predicates into genera, "according as they stood in different logical relation to the subject," has no foundation. The relation of the predicate category to the subject is not entirely a logical one; it is a relation of real existence, and wants the essential marks of the prepositional form. The logical relations of [Greek: to on] are provided for otherwise than by the categories. Aristotle has given no intimation of the course of thought by which he was led to his tenfold arrangement, and it seems hopeless to discover it. Trendelenburg in various essays has worked out the idea th
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