II. / Reality.
Negative > Of Quality < Negation.
Infinite / \ Limitation.

Categorical \ / Inherence and Subsistence
| III. | (Substance and Accident).
Hypothetical > Of Relation < Causality and Dependence
| | (Cause and Effect).
Disjunctive / \ Community (Reciprocity).

Problematical \ IV. / Possibility and Impossibility.
Assertoric > Of Modality < Existence and Non-Existence.
Apodictic / \ Necessity and Contingency.

Fichte.

Kant, it is well known, criticizes Aristotle severely for having drawn
up his categories without a principle, and claims to have disclosed
the only possible method by which an exhaustive classification might
be obtained. What he criticized in Aristotle is brought against his
own procedure by the later German thinkers, particularly Fichte and
Hegel. And in point of fact it cannot be denied that Kant has allowed
too much completeness to the ordinary logical distribution of
propositions; he has given no proof that in these forms are contained
all species of synthesis, and in consequence he has failed to show
that in the categories, or pure conceptions, are contained all the
modes of a priori synthesis. Further, his principle has so far the
unity he claimed for it, the unity of a single function, but the
specific forms in which such unity manifests itself are not themselves
accounted for by this principle. Kant himself hints more than once at
the possibility of a completely rational system of the categories, at
an evolution from one single movement of thought, and in his _Remarks
on the Table of the Categories_ gave a pregnant hint as to the method
to be employed. From any complete realization of this suggestion Kant,
however, was precluded by one portion of his theory. The categories,
although the necessary conditions under which alone an object of
experience can be thrown, are merely forms of the mind's own activity;
they apply only to sensuous and consequently subjective material.
Outside of and beyond them lies the thing-in-itself, which to Kant
represented the ultimately real. This subjectivism was a distinct
hiatus in the Kantian system, and against it principally Fichte and
Hegel directed criticism.