terprising
and the energetic would instinctively gravitate.

In the defence of the British Empire the fleet holds a twofold
position. To its general belligerent efficiency, its strength
and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be
brought to nought. It, and it only, can secure for us the control
of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious
interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered
body must depend. In time of peace it can be made a great
consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local
patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous
narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives
virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national
independence and strength.

XI

NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR[91]

[Footnote 91: Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval
Architects.)]

The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and
which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for
anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be
expected to allot to it. To discuss it adequately, a volume of no
diminutive size would be necessary. It may, however, be possible
to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main
outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration
certain points which, over and above their historical interest,
may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day.

In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have
to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. These
are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted
to meet it by the British. The former of these was described in
the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the
war in words which may be used without change at the present
time. On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the
unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed. The struggle
was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the
French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon,
wielding more than the resources of France alone. Speaking a week
after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of
success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition
that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of
the country by harassing us with the per