.

We should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself
strong enough to undertake the invasion of the United Kingdom,
Napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources
of other countries besides France, notwithstanding that by herself
France had a population more than 60 per cent. greater than that
of England. By the alliance with Spain he had added largely to
the resources on which he could draw. Moreover, his strategic
position was geographically much improved. With the exception
of that of Portugal, the coast of western continental Europe,
from the Texel to Leghorn, and somewhat later to Taranto also,
was united in hostility to us. This complicated the strategic
problem which the British Navy had to solve, as it increased the
number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction
of Napoleon's Mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in
his Atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge
and refit on Spanish territory--such as Cartagena or Cadiz--between
Toulon and the Bay of Biscay. Napoleon, therefore, enforced upon
us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of
maintaining the British Navy at the 'two-power standard' at least.
The lesson had been taught us long before by Philip II, who did
not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was
master of the resources of the whole Iberian peninsula as well
as of those of the Spanish dominions in Italy, in the Burgundian
heritage, and in the distant regions across the Atlantic Ocean.

At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was
now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and
win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough
to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across
the water which separated the starting points of his expedition
from the United Kingdom. Command of the sea to be won by a powerful
naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon's
strategy at the time of Trafalgar. It was not in deciding what
was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred:
it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he
went wrong. The British strategy adopted in opposition to that
of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of
the command of the sea. Formulated and carried into effect by
seamen, it differed in some important features from his. We may
leave out of sight for the moment t