As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative
precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but
according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative
precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the
preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil
them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.

Reply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance,
is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;
nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On
the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships
and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially
in general, what is to be done in such cases.
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QUESTION 141

OF TEMPERANCE
(In Eight Articles)

In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?

(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?

(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a
kind of touch?

(6) What is the rule of temperance?

(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?

(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1]

Whether Temperance Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a
natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now
temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines,
according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the othe