her says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live
according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible
to accord with reason."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting
what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First,
with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex,
which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire
may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that
nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not
happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no
sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).

There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity
[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or
the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these
things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason
given above.

Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason
in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3]

Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?
[*Cf. Q. 125]

Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to
the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a
more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141,
A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains."
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control