o ways, in a strict sense and
in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
_Phys._ vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with
perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of
a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult
good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating
of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does
not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as
being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a
virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way
shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a
praiseworthy passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of
virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an
elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and
disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of
intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness
pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of
its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the
species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the
vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which
is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.

Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it