stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12),
the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason:
because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by
which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of
reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed
to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance
takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects
of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of
this life requires.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded
as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that
sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas
sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and
rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the
thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is
useful for life is subordinate.

Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First,
it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is
necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards
not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But
others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in
keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other
pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a
sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to
these thi