e of money'] is the
root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of
pleasures of touch.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is
worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate,
but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of
which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch,
but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures
of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on
the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of
virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through
curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man
knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires
and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring.
Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest
evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of
death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union
of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat
and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the
sense of t