itude.

Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems
to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to
fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence
should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De
Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of
fortitude.

_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary
virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some
respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous
and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is
seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls
short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude
tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person,
whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its
difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much
less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is
accounted a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed
under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence
regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul,
albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in
reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the
other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in
a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence,
like m