ecause sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose
to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.
Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing
to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the
privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the
fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the
loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which
loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a
virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is
patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature
in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of
concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the
sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason:
and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is
commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can
tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without
the help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand,
the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto
by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4]

Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of
fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is
stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosp