as of other evils.
Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so
is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of
time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct
from patience.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity
differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather
than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while
those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be
borne patiently."

_I answer that,_ Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to
great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something
a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to
good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their
object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in
common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain
evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly,
endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more
difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for,
is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that
is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in
bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly
longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so
far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards
longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently
accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered
under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience,
says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of
arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By
saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says
"difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the
proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long
lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something