sity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any
kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
restricted sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates
the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money,
as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is
the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own
life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue
modifying the fear of death.

Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right
reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with
reason is not contrary to virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]

Whether Fortitude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of
death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their
fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is
applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De
Offic. i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel
in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think
that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of
civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge
the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now
greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not
properly concerned with death in battle.

Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's
temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are
waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought
to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of
one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license
in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not
about the danger of death in battle.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude
is chiefly about death in battle.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fo