passions: thus fortitude is
about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest
anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of
resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that
are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of
money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not
only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also
about that which is ordinary or little: because things external,
though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for
human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two
virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely
"magnificence."

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the
proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous
man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is
much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
things existing outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more
able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous
man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even
little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot
sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence
he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them
above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are
ordinary or little. In like manner he is n