d in _Ethic._ ii. Since then
every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with
fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin
is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now
fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear
is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not,
neither be thou afraid of their words."

_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its
being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order,
as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order
requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And
reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought
after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be
shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a
good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be
shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to
be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided.
Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we
should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek
for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the
appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the
appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in
general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.

Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is