ar that
withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it
is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
justified."

Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man
are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they
are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
from evil."

Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from
loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be
despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2]

Whether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is
both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is
not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due
love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due
love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly
to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the
mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the
other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness
to be opposed to fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is
concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the
rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it
belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to
reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought,
and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by
excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to
fortitude by excess of fear, in so