but great
honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a
great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on
doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to
what is worthy of great honors.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a
man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself
ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other
virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man
thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their
sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,
all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be
the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes
a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids
under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his
excellence or greatness.
Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster
or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through
magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 3.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5]
Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If
magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou
shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a
man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far
removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of
fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.
But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore
magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a
part thereof.
Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped
for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or
dared. But good is of more imp
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