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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]

Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his
action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as
to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher
says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not
employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he
should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more
imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of
fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira
i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for
action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than
for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid,
the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?"
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild
beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and
adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now
fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore
in like manner it should not employ anger.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger
helps the brave."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning
anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion
between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded
anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or
good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief,
ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the
soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in
reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the
movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport
themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command
of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more