fly in the soul, since it
is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results
from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude
is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers
fortitude among the virtues.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue
is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good."
Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes
a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in
accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22).
Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his
work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by
rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual
virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human
affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the
obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs.
Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the
rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of
pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason
requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is
in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that
presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the
mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as
a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it
conforms man to reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the
infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the
Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear
bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue
of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity,
and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.
Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a
virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than
virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in
which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
performing acts of fortitude
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