it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and
pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion.
Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God
than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay
another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel
spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer
in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the
commandment of God.

Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a
precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.
And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all
virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of
virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of
virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if
there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept,
that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue
is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine
authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to
God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede,
even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience
is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of
one good may be compensated by obedience and