the good also of
one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to
charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom:
and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were
not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a
gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie."

Reply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3;
I-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the
decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our
neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness
against our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad
sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it
is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is
iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways.
First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and
their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition
is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in
his exposition of Isa. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains
that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be
considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal
meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity
of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an
eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words
of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.

Reply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal
sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a
sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another
species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to
another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a