stity and poverty in all things.
Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior
are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all
things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at
the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of
justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by
its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance
arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not
burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly,
through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since,
though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is
not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes
subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as
regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two
reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in
all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as
a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that
resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St.
Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order,
are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul?
Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another,
will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter?
Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must
disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound
to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something
wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis
iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man:
for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and
assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in
matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound
to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have
to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature
all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters
touching the nature of the body, for instan