s an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the
truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3.

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated
according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of
justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life
a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man
observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to
another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do
with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of
life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as
referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the
truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true
evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of
justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are
now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a
man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are
not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this
apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of
truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 4]

Whether the Virtue of Truth Inclines Rather to That Which Is Less?

Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to
that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so
does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five,
than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and
to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore
the virtue of tr