uth does not incline to that which is less rather
than to that which is greater.

Obj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to
one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.

Obj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to
amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom;
and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to
an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth
than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the
denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it
seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than
to that which is less.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less."

_I answer that,_ There are two ways of declining from the truth to
that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show
the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so
forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is
contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to
what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this
seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For
those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a
source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass
others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a
source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their
moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): "Though I should
have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the
truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me."

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say
that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this
virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply
falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not
indeed as regards the proper aspect of t