n as possible. You will
immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross
the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is
necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on
before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I
am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief
fully concur with the President in these instructions."

This express order was reinforced by a long letter from the President,
dated October 13, specifically pointing out the decided advantages
McClellan possessed over the enemy, and suggesting a plan of campaign
even to details, the importance and value of which was self-evident.

"You remember my speaking to you of what I called your
over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be
at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?... Change
positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your
communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread
his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives
up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but
to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall
upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the
water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route
that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him,
unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route
is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good
on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross
the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My
idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications,
which I would seize, if he would permit. If he should move northward I
would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should
prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would
press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should
present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I
say 'try'; if we never try we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand
at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there,
on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of
coming to us,