nd. He had won a favorable reputation in leading the
expedition against Roanoke Island and the North Carolina coast; and,
called to reinforce McClellan after the Peninsula disaster, commanded
the left wing of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. He was not
covetous of the honor now given him. He had already twice declined it,
and only now accepted the command as a duty under the urgent advice of
members of his staff. His instincts were better than the judgment of his
friends. A few brief weeks sufficed to demonstrate what he had told
them--that he "was not competent to command such a large army."

The very beginning of his work proved the truth of his self-criticism.
Rejecting all the plans of campaign which were suggested to him, he
found himself incapable of forming any very plausible or consistent one
of his own. As a first move he concentrated his army opposite the town
of Fredericksburg on the lower Rappahannock, but with such delays that
General Lee had time to seize and strongly fortify the town and the
important adjacent heights on the south bank; and when Burnside's army
crossed on December 11, and made its main and direct attack on the
formidable and practically impregnable Confederate intrenchments on the
thirteenth, a crushing repulse and defeat of the Union forces, with a
loss of over ten thousand killed and wounded, was the quick and direful
result.

It was in a spirit of stubborn determination rather than clear,
calculating courage that he renewed his orders for an attack on the
fourteenth; but, dissuaded by his division and corps commanders from the
rash experiment, succeeded without further damage in withdrawing his
forces on the night of the fifteenth to their old camps north of the
river. In manly words his report of the unfortunate battle gave generous
praise to his officers and men, and assumed for himself all the
responsibility for the attack and its failure. But its secondary
consequences soon became irremediable. By that gloomy disaster Burnside
almost completely lost the confidence of his officers and men, and
rumors soon came to the President that a spirit akin to mutiny pervaded
the army. When information came that, on the day after Christmas,
Burnside was preparing for a new campaign, the President telegraphed
him:

"I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of
the army without letting me know."

This, naturally, brought Burnside to the President for explanation,