s
Lincoln answered on the fifth of that month:

"In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would
by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at
Fredericksburg tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in
intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst
you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an
advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of
being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and
liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore
one way or kick the other."

Five days later, Hooker, having become convinced that a large part of
Lee's army was in motion toward the Shenandoah valley, proposed the
daring plan of a quick and direct march to capture Richmond. But the
President immediately telegraphed him a convincing objection:

"If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's
moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not
be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile, your communications, and
with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not
Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper
Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your
lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers.
If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."

The movement northward of Lee's army, effectually masked for some days
by frequent cavalry skirmishes, now became evident to the Washington
authorities. On June 14, Lincoln telegraphed Hooker:

"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at
Winchester, and Tyler at Martinsburg If they could hold out a few days,
could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and
the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and
Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not
break him?"

While Lee, without halting, crossed the Potomac above Harper's Ferry,
and continued his northward march into Maryland and Pennsylvania, Hooker
prudently followed on the "inside track" as Mr. Lincoln had suggested,
interposing the Union army effectually to guard Washington and
Baltimore. But at this point a long-standing irritation and jealousy
between Hooker and Halleck became so acute that on the
general-in-chief's refusing a comparatively minor request,