tory. The terrible losses of
the battle of Gettysburg--over three thousand killed, fourteen thousand
wounded, and five thousand captured or missing of the Union army; and
twenty-six hundred killed, twelve thousand wounded, and five thousand
missing of the Confederates--largely occupied the thoughts and labors of
both sides during the national holiday which followed. It was a surprise
to Meade that on the morning of July 5 the Confederate army had
disappeared, retreating as rapidly as might be to the neighborhood of
Harper's Ferry. Unable immediately to cross because the Potomac was
swollen by heavy rains, and Meade having followed and arrived in Lee's
front on July 10, President Lincoln had the liveliest hopes that Meade
would again attack and capture or destroy the Confederate army. Generous
praise for his victory, and repeated and urgent suggestions to renew his
attack and end the rebellion, had gone to Meade from the President and
General Halleck. But Meade hesitated, and his council of war objected;
and on the night of July 13 Lee recrossed the Potomac in retreat. When
he heard the news, Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticism
and disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at the
escape of Lee:

"The case, summarily stated, is this: You fought and beat the enemy at
Gettysburg, and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as
yours. He retreated and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly
pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him till, by slow degrees,
you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops
directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance,
all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg, while it was
not possible that he had received a single recruit, and yet you stood
and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away
at his leisure, without attacking him.... Again, my dear general, I do
not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in
Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him
would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war.
As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not
safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the
river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the
force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do
not