Chicago to stop the
draft. The final effect of the conscription law was not so much to
obtain recruits for the service, as to stimulate local effort throughout
the country to promote volunteering, whereby the number drafted was
either greatly lessened or, in many localities, entirely avoided by
filling the State quotas.
The military arrest of Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democratic member of
Congress from Ohio, for incendiary language denouncing the draft, also
grew to an important incident. Arrested and tried under the orders of
General Burnside, a military commission found him guilty of having
violated General Order No. 38, by "declaring disloyal sentiments and
opinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the
government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion"; and
sentenced him to military confinement during the war. Judge Leavitt of
the United States Circuit Court denied a writ of _habeas corpus_ in the
case. President Lincoln regretted the arrest, but felt it imprudent to
annul the action of the general and the military tribunal. Conforming to
a clause of Burnside's order, he modified the sentence by sending
Vallandigham south beyond the Union military lines. The affair created a
great sensation, and, in a spirit of party protest, the Ohio Democrats
unanimously nominated Vallandigham for governor. Vallandigham went to
Richmond, held a conference with the Confederate authorities, and, by
way of Bermuda, went to Canada, from whence he issued a political
address. The Democrats of both Ohio and New York took up the political
and legal discussion with great heat, and sent imposing committees to
present long addresses to the President on the affair.
Mr. Lincoln made long written replies to both addresses of which only so
much needs quoting here as concisely states his interpretation of his
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_:
"You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all
the guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of conserving the
public safety--when I may choose to say the public safety requires it.
This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me
as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a
question who shall decide or an affirmation that nobody shall decide,
what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion.
The Constitution contemplates the question as likely
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