ellan. He sent a
prompting telegram to that general: "Please do not let him [the enemy]
get off without being hurt." He recognized the battle of Antietam as a
substantial, if not a complete victory, and seized the opportunity it
afforded him to issue his preliminary proclamation of emancipation on
September 22.

For two weeks after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan kept his
army camped on various parts of the field, and so far from exhibiting
any disposition of advancing against the enemy in the Shenandoah valley,
showed constant apprehension lest the enemy might come and attack him.
On October 1, the President and several friends made a visit to
Antietam, and during the three succeeding days reviewed the troops and
went over the various battle-grounds in company with the general. The
better insight which the President thus received of the nature and
results of the late battle served only to deepen in his mind the
conviction he had long entertained--how greatly McClellan's defects
overbalanced his merits as a military leader; and his impatience found
vent in a phrase of biting irony. In a morning walk with a friend,
waving his arm toward the white tents of the great army, he asked: "Do
you know what that is?" The friend, not catching the drift of his
thought, said, "It is the Army of the Potomac, I suppose." "So it is
called," responded the President, in a tone of suppressed indignation,
"But that is a mistake. It is only McClellan's body-guard."

At that time General McClellan commanded a total force of one hundred
thousand men present for duty under his immediate eye, and seventy-three
thousand present for duty under General Banks about Washington. It is,
therefore, not to be wondered at that on October 6, the second day after
Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington, the following telegram went to the
general from Halleck:

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that
you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south.
Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river
between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your
operation, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men. If you move
up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve thousand or
fifteen thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the interior
line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is
very desirous that your army move as soo