he Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from
the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of
the Department of the Potomac."

This order of March 11 included also the already mentioned consolidation
of the western departments under Halleck; and out of the region lying
between Halleck's command and McClellan's command it created the
Mountain Department, the command of which he gave to General Fremont,
whose reinstatement had been loudly clamored for by many prominent and
enthusiastic followers.

As the preparations for a movement by water had been in progress since
February 27, there was little delay in starting the Army of the Potomac
on its new campaign. The troops began their embarkation on March 17, and
by April 5 over one hundred thousand men, with all their material of
war, had been transported to Fortress Monroe, where General McClellan
himself arrived on the second of the month, and issued orders to begin
his march on the fourth.

Unfortunately, right at the outset of this new campaign, General
McClellan's incapacity and want of candor once more became sharply
evident. In the plan formulated by the four corps commanders, and
approved by himself, as well as emphatically repeated by the President's
instructions, was the essential requirement that Washington should be
left entirely secure. Learning that the general had neglected this
positive injunction, the President ordered McDowell's corps to remain
for the protection of the capital; and when the general complained of
this, Mr. Lincoln wrote him on April 9:

"After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized
men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left
for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this,
even, was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps,
once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up on the line
of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again
exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This
presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a
great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and
sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the
judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had
been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied