Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?"

"_Third_. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?"

"_Fourth_. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would
break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?"

"_Fifth_. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by
your plan than mine?"

Instead of specifically answering the President's concise
interrogatories, McClellan, on the following day, presented to the
Secretary of War a long letter, reciting in much detail his statement of
what he had done since coming to Washington, and giving a rambling
outline of what he thought might be accomplished in the future
prosecution of the war. His reasoning in favor of an advance by
Chesapeake Bay upon Richmond, instead of against Manassas Junction,
rests principally upon the assumption that at Manassas the enemy is
prepared to resist, while at Richmond there are no preparations; that to
win Manassas would give us only the field of battle and the moral effect
of a victory, while to win Richmond would give us the rebel capital with
its communications and supplies; that at Manassas we would fight on a
field chosen by the enemy, while at Richmond we would fight on one
chosen by ourselves. If as a preliminary hypothesis these comparisons
looked plausible, succeeding events quickly exposed their fallacy.

The President, in his anxious studies and exhaustive discussion with
military experts in the recent conferences, fully comprehended that
under McClellan's labored strategical theories lay a fundamental error.
It was not the capture of a place, but the destruction of the rebel
armies that was needed to subdue the rebellion. But Mr. Lincoln also saw
the fearful responsibility he would be taking upon himself if he forced
McClellan to fight against his own judgment and protest, even though
that judgment was incorrect. The whole subject, therefore, underwent a
new and yet more elaborate investigation. The delay which this rendered
necessary was soon greatly lengthened by two other causes. It was about
this time that the telegraph brought news from the West of the surrender
of Fort Henry, February 6, the investment of Fort Donelson on the
thirteenth, and its surrender on the sixteenth, incidents which absorbed
the constant attention of the President and the Secretary of War. Almost
simultaneously, a heavy domestic sorrow fell upon Mr. Lincoln in the
serious