f feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is
common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point,
let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We
have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
suspend our judgment, namel