was not able to bestow a benefit upon me, but I shall not be under any
obligation to him. I also shall wish to bestow something upon him, even
as he did upon me; but if fortune be more favorable to me than to him,
and I succeed in bestowing something upon him, my doing so will be a
benefit bestowed upon him, not a repayment out of gratitude for what he
did for me. It will become his duty to be grateful to me; I shall have
begun the interchange of benefits; the series must be counted from my
act.

XII. I already understand what you wish to ask; there is no need for you
to say anything, your countenance speaks for you. "If any one does us
good for his own sake, are we," you ask, "under an obligation to him? I
often hear you complain that there are some things which men make use
of themselves, but which they put down to the account of others." I will
tell you, my Liberalis; but first let me distinguish between the two
parts of your question, and separate what is fair from what is unfair.
It makes a great difference whether any one bestows a benefit upon us
for his own sake, or whether he does so partly for his own sake and
partly for ours. He who looks only to his own interests, and who does us
good because he cannot otherwise make a profit for himself, seems to
me to be like the farmer who provides winter and summer fodder for his
flocks, or like the man who feeds up the captives whom he has bought
in order that they may fetch a better price in the slave market, or who
crams and curry-combs fat oxen for sale; or like the keeper of a
school of arms, who takes great pains in exercising and equipping his
gladiators. As Cleanthes says, there is a great difference between
benefits and trade.

XIII. On the other hand, I am not so unjust as to feel no gratitude to
a man, because, while helping me, he helped himself also; for I do
not insist upon his consulting my interests to the exclusion of his
own--nay, I should prefer that the benefit which I receive may be of
even greater advantage to the giver, provided that he thought of us
both when giving it, and meant to divide it between me and himself. Even
should he possess the larger portion of it, still, if he admits me to
a share, if he meant it for both of us, I am not only unjust but
ungrateful, if I do not rejoice in what has benefited me benefiting him
also. It is the essence of spitefulness to say that nothing can be a
benefit which does not cause some inconvenience to th