to those riches of mine. I know the kingdom of
wisdom, which is great and stable: I possess every thing, and in such a
manner that it belongs to all men nevertheless."

XI. When, therefore, Gaius Caesar offered him two hundred thousand
sesterces, he laughingly refused it, thinking it unworthy of himself to
boast of having refused so small a sum. Ye gods and goddesses, what a
mean mind must the emperor have had, if he hoped either to honour or to
corrupt him. I must here repeat a proof of his magnanimity. I have
heard that when he was expressing his wonder at the folly of Gaius at
supposing that he could be influenced by such a bribe, he said, "If
he meant to tempt me, he ought to have tried to do so by offering his
entire kingdom."

XII. It is possible, then, to give something to the wise man, although
all things belong to the wise man. Similarly, though we declare that
friends have all things in common, it is nevertheless possible to give
something to a friend: for I have not everything in common with a friend
in the same manner as with a partner, where one part belongs to him,
and another to me, but rather as a father and a mother possess their
children in common when they have two, not each parent possessing one
child, but each possessing both. First of all I will prove that any
chance would-be partner of mine has nothing in common with me: and why?
Because this community of goods can only exist between wise men, who
are alone capable of friendship: other men can neither be friends nor
partners one to another. In the next place, things may be owned in
common in various ways. The knights' seats in the theatre belong to all
the Roman knights; yet of these the seat which I occupy becomes my own,
and if I yield it up to any one, although I only yield him a thing
which we own in common, still I appear to have given him something. Some
things belong to certain persons under particular conditions. I have
a place among the knights, not to sell, or to let, or to dwell in, but
simply to see the spectacle from, wherefore I do not tell an untruth
when I say that I have a place among the knights' seats. Yet if, when I
come into the theatre, the knights' seats are full, I both have a seat
there by right, because I have the privilege of sitting there, and I
have not a seat there, because my seat is occupied by those who share my
right to those places. Suppose that the same thing takes place between
friends; whatever our friend po