d feel that I owed something for the
gift, because it did reach me, though not directly. To lay me under an
obligation, a thing must be done for my sake alone."

XX. "According to this," argues our opponent, "you are under no
obligation to the sun or the moon; for they do not move for your sake
alone." No, but since they move with the object of preserving the
balance of the universe, they move for my sake also, seeing that I am
a fraction of the universe. Besides, our position and theirs is not the
same, for he who does me good in order that he may by my means do good
to himself, does not bestow a benefit upon me, because he merely makes
use of me as an instrument for his own advantage; whereas the sun and
the moon, even if they do us good for their own sakes, still cannot do
good to us in order that by our means they may do good to themselves,
for what is there which we can bestow upon them?

XXI. "I should be sure," replies he, "that the sun and the moon wished
to do us good, if they were able to refuse to do so; but they cannot
help moving as they do. In short, let them stop and discontinue their
work."

See now, in how many ways this argument may be refuted. One who cannot
refuse to do a thing may nevertheless wish to do it; indeed there is no
greater proof of a fixed desire to do anything, than not to be able to
alter one's determination. A good man cannot leave undone what he does:
for unless he does it he will not be a good man. Is a good man, then,
not able to bestow a benefit, because he does what he ought to do, and
is not able not to do what he ought to do? Besides this, it makes
a great difference whether you say, "He is not able not to do this,
because he is forced to do it," or "He is not able to wish not to do
it;" for, if he could not help doing it, then I am not indebted for it
to him, but to the person who forced him to do it; if he could not help
wishing for it because he had nothing better to wish for, then it is he
who forces himself to do it, and in this case the debt which as acting
under compulsion he could not claim, is due to him as compelling
himself.

"Let the sun and moon cease to wish to benefit us," says our adversary.
I answer, "Remember what has been said. Who can be so crazy as to refuse
the name of free-will to that which has no danger of ceasing to act, and
of adopting the opposite course, since, on the contrary, he whose will
is fixed for ever, must be thought to wish more earnes