ay not be in his debt.

XVIII. With regard to the other class of benefit, the question arises
whether if I was not able to take it without being a wise man, I am able
to return it, except to a wise man. For suppose I do return it to him,
he cannot receive it, he is not any longer able to receive such a thing,
he has lost the knowledge of how to use it. You would not bid me throw
back [Footnote: i.e. in the game of ball.] a ball to a man who has lost
his hand; it is folly to give any one what he cannot receive. If I am
to begin to reply to the last argument, I say that I should not give him
what he is unable to take; but I would return it, even though he is not
able to receive it. I cannot lay him under an obligation unless he takes
my bounty; but by returning it I can free myself from my obligations to
him. You say, "he will not be able to use it." Let him see to that; the
fault will lie with him, not with me.

XIX. "To return a thing," says our adversary, "is to hand it over to one
who can receive it. Why, if you owed some wine to any man, and he bade
you pour it into a net or a sieve, would you say that you had returned
it? or would you be willing to return it in such a way that in the act
of returning it was lost between you?" To return is to give that which
you owe back to its owner when he wishes for it. It is not my duty to
perform more than this; that he should possess what he has received
from me is a matter for further consideration; I do not owe him the
safe-keeping of his property, but the honourable payment of my debt,
and it is much better that he should not have it, than that I should
not return it to him. I would repay my creditor, even though he would
at once take what I paid him to the market; even if he deputed an
adulteress to receive the money from me, I would pay it to her; even
if he were to pour the coins which he receives into a loose fold of his
cloak, I would pay it. It is my business to return it to him, not to
keep it and save it for him after I have returned it; I am bound to take
care of his bounty when I have received it, but not when I have returned
it to him. While it remains with me, it must be kept safe; but when he
asks for it again I must give it to him, even though it slips out of his
hands as he takes it. I will repay a good man when it is convenient; I
will repay a bad man when he asks me to do so.

"You cannot," argues our adversary, "return him a benefit of the same
kind as th