, because they were then numerically the weaker
party.

And here at once must be made a distinction, which for intelligent
comprehension it is essential to keep in mind. Putting entirely to one
side all question of the merits of the quarrel--of its right or its
wrong--it must be steadily remembered that, although the comparative
aggregate strength of the two parties placed the Boers from the first
on the defensive in the general sense, they were at the beginning of
hostilities decisively superior in local force, and would so remain
until sufficient reinforcements from Great Britain should arrive to
turn the scale. Under such circumstances, correct military
principle--and the Boers have had good advisers--imperatively dictates
that the belligerent so situated must at once assume an active
{p.026} offensive. By rapid and energetic movement, while the
opponent's forces are still separated, every advantage must be seized
to destroy hostile detachments within reach, and to establish one's
own front as far in advance of the great national interests, as it can
be reasonably hoped to maintain it with communications unbroken. The
line thus occupied must rest upon positions so chosen that by their
strength, natural and developed, it shall be possible, when offence
has to be exchanged for defensive warfare, to impose to the utmost
upon the invader both delay and loss; for delay and loss mean
lessening power, and only by causing such diminution, greater
relatively than his own, can the weaker hope eventually to reverse the
odds and win the game.

To this end, therefore, the Boers with sound military judgment at once
devoted themselves; and it is very likely that the surmise before
quoted was correct--in naming the Hex River Pass and Durban as their
ultimate objectives, to be reached by a swift advance. The latter was
certainly not an unreasonable hope, and it is possible that with
{p.027} more precise accuracy of combination, and an offensive more
resolutely sustained, they might have attained their purpose, through
the mistaken primary dispositions of the British, who, though
recognizing themselves to be for the time on the defensive,
nevertheless, for political reasons, advanced their front of
operations to a point with which, as it proved, they could not secure
their communications. From the worst consequences of this error they
were saved by the gallantry and skill with which advantage was taken
of the defective co-operation