ediate
despatch of troops sufficient to protect the colony. In response to
this, orders were issued on September 8 for 5,700 men to start from
India, and a small additional force from England itself, making a
total of from seven to eight thousand. These were expected to arrive,
and actually did for the most part arrive, between October 12 and 19,
but even so were barely in time for the critical moment. They were
also only sufficient imperfectly to defend the colony, and were by no
means adequate to the offensive purpose which the Boer Government, in
its ultimatum, professed to discern.

Meanwhile, on the 25th of September, Glencoe had been occupied by a
detachment from Ladysmith, while reinforcements were sent to the
latter. It had by this time been recognized that the attempt to hold
the more advanced positions, such as Newcastle and Laing's Nek, would
expose the forces so placed to the fate of isolation which afterward
befell Ladysmith. The course of both the Imperial and colonial
governments at this period {p.031} was much affected by a wish not to
precipitate hostile action on the part of the Boers; for, in general,
war was not desired by the British, and, in particular, they were as
yet unready. On the 28th, however, such definite and threatening
movements were reported that the Natal Ministry decided at all hazards
to call out the volunteers, although it had apprehended that this step
would be considered practically equivalent to a declaration of war.

The increase of force in Natal to 15,000 men determined the sending
out of an officer superior in rank to General Symons. Sir George
White, designated for this duty, reached Cape Town October 3, and in
view of the serious news he there received, proceeded at once to
Durban. On the 9th, the day the Boer ultimatum was issued, he had at
Pietermaritzburg an interview with the Governor, in which he expressed
his disapproval of the position at Glencoe--an opinion in which other
officers of rank present coincided. The Governor replied that General
Symons had thought it safe, even before the Indian contingent arrived;
that the step had been {p.032} taken to assure the coal supply; and
that to recede from it now would involve grave political consequences,
disheartening the loyal, and tending to encourage a rising among the
blacks and the disaffected Dutch. Without changing his opinion as to
the military error involved, Sir George White resolved to allow the
detachment to r